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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * 
MARILYN L. AHLUWALIA, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) BRIEF OF APPELLATE 
vs. ) 
) Appeal No. 940052-CA 
HAMINDER S. AHLUWALIA, ) 
) (Oral Argument 
Defendant-Appellee ) Priority No. 4) 
* * * * * * * * * 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal from the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County is Article VIII, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1988); and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court by order 
dated January 27, 1994. 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING MRS. AHLUWALIA'S 
REQUEST FOR CUSTODY, POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE AND IN 
CONSEQUENTLY ORDERING CHILD SUPPORT? This is a question of Law and 
fact reviewed for correctness and under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989); 
Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING MRS. AHLUWALIA'S 
REQUEST FOR ALIMONY? This is a question of law and fact reviewed 
for correctness and a clearly erroneous standard. Marchant v. Park 
City, 771 P. 2d 677 (Utah App. 1989); Matter of Estate of Bartell, 
776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989^ . 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances or rules whose interpretation is believed to be solely 
determinative of the outcome of this case. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
in District Court, 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a divorce case 
entered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The final 
judgment was entered on December 16, 199 3. Mrs. Ahluwalia filed 
her notice of appeal on January 14, 1994. There has been no cross-
appeal filed in the action. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
This case was instituted against the appellee Haminder S. 
Ahluwalia, for a divorce by his wife the Plaintiff, Marilyn L. 
Ahluwalia. Mrs. Ahluwalia sought custody of the party's minor 
children and permanent alimony from an almost 17 year marriage. 
Mrs. Ahluwalia had initially separated from her husband and moved 
from the family residence because her husband would not move, to 
relieve the stress imposed on the family by the parties' marital 
problems. Mrs. Ahluwalia then filed for divorce. The children 
remained in the residence with their father from the time of 
separation through the time of trial. 
Mr. Ahluwalia had been ordered temporarily to pay alimony 
which was paid until the time of trial. The parties had real and 
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personal property, the division of which is not in dispute in this 
appeal except in so far that the Plaintiff had requested that if 
she were awarded custody of the minor children that she retain the 
marital residence and pay the Defendant one-half of the equity in 
such residence. 
Mr. Ahluwalia counter-claimed, contesting custody, 
alimony, and possession and ownership of the marital residence. 
A custody evaluation was performed by Elizabeth Hickey. 
In such evaluation, Ms. Hickey found both parents to be fit and 
proper. Ms. Hickey recommended that the Defendant receive custody 
of the minor children. Ms. Hickey's recommendation was based on 
her reasoning that the children had been with their father through 
the period of separation, that such situation was stable and 
adjusted to and that the children had better come to know and 
relate to their father during the separation period, even though 
Mrs. Ahluwalia had been the primary care taker for their entire 
lives prior thereto. Ms. Hickey did not recommend upsetting the 
current situation because the children had adjusted. Ms. Hickey 
also reported the children did not want the situation to change 
while not directly wanting to choose between their parents. For 
those reasons Ms. Hickey recommended the Defendant receive custody. 
The Court ignored the substantial evidence at trial that 
Mr. Ahluwalia would make and had made visitation by Mrs. Ahluwalia 
difficult and that he had not and would not encourage the parental 
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rights of the Plaintiff. The Court ignored the recommendation of 
Ms. Hickey regarding joint custody and awarded the custody of the 
minor children of the parties to the father. The Court ignored the 
substantial evidence of Mr. Ahluwalia's emotional and abusive 
problems. Additionally, the Court either misunderstood or ignored 
the nature of the testimony of the Plaintiff concerning her 
employment and wrongly imputed excess income to the Plaintiff for 
purposes of child support, doing so even in an incorrect amount 
given the Court's imputing of income figure. 
The Court denied alimony, notwithstanding the fact that 
the Defendant is a successful engineer whose career was supported 
and enhanced by moves of the parties throughout the course of the 
marriage. The moves of the parties necessitated Mrs. Ahluwalia 
terminating her tenured, professional teaching employment in 
Florida in the early stages of the marriage. Mrs. Ahluwalia has 
been unable to regain similar employment because of the difficult 
job market in her profession, although it was uncontested that she 
has been attempting to do so. 
In denying alimony, the Trial Court ignored the 
sacrifices for the marriage of Mrs. Ahluwalia in following her 
husband and supporting his career, to the detriment of her career. 
Even though Mrs. Ahluwalia sacrificed for the career of the 
Defendant to the extent that she had to give up her full-time, 
tenured employment in her chosen and qualified profession, the 
Trial Court found she deserved no opportunity or support from the 
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Defendant to regain employment in her chosen field or any 
opportunity to be retrained in a field in which she could have 
comparable opportunities or benefits. The Trial Court ignored the 
obviously overstated financial information of the Defendant in 
finding he had no ability to pay alimony. 
The decision of the Trial Court resulted in a woman in a 
17-year marriage, who had been the primary care taker of the minor 
children, and who as a result of extreme marital stress and abuse 
stress was forced to leave her home for her own mental stability, 
and did so in a manner that benefitted the children, was denied 
custody as a result of that division to escape from an abusive 
situation. Additionally, the Trial Court found that a woman who 
was a professional with tenured employment at the time of the 
marriage, who terminated that employment to move with her husband 
and family in pursuit of his career, who supported her husband to 
develop an excellent earning capacity, is not entitled to any 
alimony whatsoever after 17 years to at least at a minimum permit 
her to reestablish herself in the workforce in a professional 
capacity similar to the position she was in at the time of the 
marriage. Our so-called court of equity permitted Mr. Ahluwalia to 
utilize the effort and support of Mrs. Ahluwalia to place him in an 
excellent earning position and at the time of divorce, denied Mrs. 
Ahluwalia the chance to have the same benefit. 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING MRS. AHLUWALIA'S 
REQUEST FOR CUSTODY, POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE AND IN 
CONSEQUENTLY ORDERING CHILD SUPPORT? 
The Trial Court accepted as the evidence to support 
custody for Mr. Ahluwalia the statements of Ms. Hickey that the 
children were doing well, that they had developed a better 
relationship with their father from the separation until the time 
of trial and the Court followed an inferred preference of the minor 
daughter to keep the children with their father. The Trial Court 
ignored the evidence that Mrs. Ahluwalia was the primary care taker 
of the children, that she was and had been a good mother, that her 
relationship with the children was one of a loving, caring 
relationship, that she would encourage the parental rights and 
opportunities of Mr. Ahluwalia and that the children were well 
adjusted, good children that she had nurtured and cared for their 
entire lifetime. 
The inability of Mr. Ahluwalia to support Mrs. Ahluwalia 
in her parental rights to be with the children as was clearly 
stated in the evidence, and the contrary being true that Mrs. 
Ahluwalia would support the Defendant in his parental rights with 
the children was critical evidence the Court ignored in awarding 
custody to Mrs. Ahluwalia. The Court ignored the evidence that Mr. 
Ahluwalia had not during the course of the children's lives paid 
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any substantial attention until he was forced to by virtue of the 
separation of the parties. The Court ignored the evidence of Mr. 
Ahluwalia's physical and emotional abusive behavior, and his double 
standards for family members. The critical evidence ignored by the 
Trial Court constituted a clear abuse of a discretion and a serious 
injustice when custody of the minor children was awarded to the 
Defendant. 
If the Court changes the award of custody, it should 
consequently consider change of possession of the marital residence 
and should require the Defendant to pay child support. 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING MRS AHLUWALIA'S 
REQUEST FOR ALIMONY? 
The evidence of the earnings and financial condition of 
the parties in terms of month to month living was uncontroverted at 
Trial. The Defendant did not contest the claimed income and 
expenditures of the Plaintiff. The evidence at trial proved the 
Defendant had at least $19 00 a month in discretionary income from 
which he could pay alimony. (Tr. at R. 234-254). The Court's 
finding to the contrary (Tr. at R. 131) is simply not supported by 
the evidence. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff fell short in 
income to match her need of approximately $1500 every month (for a 
bare minimum income level), while the Defendant had the ability to 
pay her to meet this sum, the Trial Court still refused to require 
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the Defendant to pay alimony to the Plaintiff, 
The Trial Court in this case has seriously abused its 
obligation and discretion as a court of equity. The evidence is 
uncontroverted that Mrs. Ahluwalia was working in a tenured 
teaching position at the time of the marriage of the parties and 
continued to do so for a couple of years after the marriage. She 
then had to terminate her employment to follow the Defendant and 
family and support the growth of his professional career by moving 
to Pennsylvania and thereafter to Utah. During the time period 
that the family lived in Pennsylvania and in Utah, the Plaintiff 
was unable to obtain a full-time teaching position and was not even 
permitted to do so by the demands of Mr. Ahluwalia that she 
immediately go to work once they got to Pennsylvania and remain in 
a less-skilled, lower paying job to assist in the purchase of a 
house for the family. 
The Defendant has now developed his professional career 
to the point where he is earning in excess of $55,000 per year. 
Mrs. Ahluwalia on the other hand, is forced to work part time work 
earning $6.25 -an hour because she has not been able to obtain a 
similar kind of teaching position to that which she had in the 
beginning of the marriage. For the Trial Court to not require Mr. 
Ahluwalia to assist Mrs. Ahluwalia to obtain a teaching position, 
to be retrained or assisted for at least a period of time, when he 
has the ability to pay, is clearly an abuse of the Trial Court's 




A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING MRS- AHLUWALIA'S 
REQUEST FOR CUSTODY, POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE AND IN 
CONSEQUENTLY ORDERING CHILD SUPPORT? 
In order to determine if the Trial Court erred in denying 
Mrs. Ahluwalia's request for custody, the Appellant must overcome 
the requirement for the Appellate Court, as set forth in Baker v. 
Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah Ct. of App. 1993) where at 
page 28, the Court stated: 
Accordingly we view "the evidence and all the inferences 
that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most 
supportive of the trial court's findings.... We will 
alter the trial court's property division "only if there 
was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion.... Thus, to prevail on appeal 
of the trial court's findings as to the property 
division, Mrs. Baker must marshall the evidence that 
supports the findings and then demonstrate that, despite 
such evidence, the findings are "so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence and, 
therefore, clearly erroneous.".... 
The same standard of overturning the trial court's 
findings applies to a custody decision as to property division 
decisions. 
The facts in evidence which support the finding of 
custody on behalf of Mr. Ahluwalia are as follows: 
1. As set forth in the custody evaluation of Elizabeth 
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Hickey, the Defendant, since he received physical custody of the 
children after this divorce case was filed, has spent more time 
than previously with the children and his relationship with his 
children has been strengthened. (Tr. at R. 171-172). 
2. As set forth in the Custody Evaluation and testimony 
of Ms. Hickey, the children desired the stability of staying in the 
family residence (Tr. at R.172). 
3. Ms. Hickey expressed that the Defendant, at the time 
of Trial, had custody of the minor children for approximately 19 
months, the children had adjusted to the current situation, were 
doing well and she believed that they would be better off staying 
in that situation than upsetting them having their mother move back 
in and having to readjust to their mother's custody. (Tr. at R. 
172-177). 
4. The Defendant is a professional person with a steady 
and consistent means of employment (Tr. at R. 229-231, 264), Trial 
Exhibit 15. 
5. As set forth in the testimony of Ms. Hickey (Tr. at R. 
172-178, 181-183), she supported her report by testifying that the 
Defendant believed in more of a structured environment than the 
Plaintiff and to have that such structure implemented in the home. 
Ms. Hickey testified that she believed that structure was important 
for the children. Additionally, Ms. Hickey testified (Tr. at R. 
172) that the children were doing better in school and especially 
the parties' daughter since the separation of the parties. 
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The above stated facts are the only ones in the record 
that take the position that the Defendant is the better choice as 
a custodial parent. All remaining facts are either neutral, that 
is that Ms. Hickey could not determine that one parent was better 
than the other in a close call (Tr. at R. 182-183), or are in favor 
of Mrs. Ahluwalia being named the custodial parent. 
The evidence that supports Mrs. Ahluwalia being the 
custodial parent are as follows: 
1. Mrs. Ahluwalia was admittedly the primary care 
provider for the minor children the entire time of the marriage 
from the children's birth until the time of separation. See 
Exhibit 14. 
2. Elizabeth Hickey testified that the children were 
good, well adjusted children. (Tr. at R. 182-183), and this came 
about primarily as a result of their nurturing by Mrs. Ahluwalia. 
3. Mrs. Ahluwalia is the type of person that provides a 
spontaneity and appreciation for life in the children. (Tr. at R. 
180-182). 
4. It is uncontroverted that Mrs. Ahluwalia was the 
parent involved in taking the children to all their activities (Tr. 
at R. 201-202). The Defendant did not participate on a regular 
basis in the taking the children to their activities and being 
involved with them. (Tr. at R. 201-202, 204-205). 
5. The Defendant is a controlling, manipulative person. 
(Tr. at R. 194-201, 205). 
6. The Defendant is a physically and mentally abusive 
12 
person. (Tr. at R. 144-146, 194-201, 208-209). See also Trial 
Exhibit 1. 
7. Mrs. Ahluwalia cared enough for her children to be 
willing to make the difficult decision to move out of the home and 
leave the children in the home in order to remove the stress 
related to her marital difficulties with the Defendant while having 
as an utmost consideration the well being of the children (Tr. at 
R. 209-210), contrary to the Defendant who was willing to invite an 
outsider into the home to live (his father), (Tr. at R. 205-207) 
with no consideration to the feelings of Mrs. Ahluwalia or the 
other family members. 
8. Ms. Hickey testified that Mrs. Ahluwalia was willing 
to support and encourage the parental relationship of the Defendant 
(Tr. at R. 185), while on the other hand, Ms. Hickey was not 
willing to testify that the Defendant would do the same thing, (Tr. 
at R. 186-187). 
9. The Defendant in fact refused to permit Mrs. 
Ahluwalia to visit with the parties' minor son, insisted that he go 
to a day-care instead of being with Mrs. Ahluwalia on the basis 
that Mr. Ahluwalia stated that Mrs. Ahluwalia should be out looking 
for a job instead of spending time with her son. (Tr. at R. 207-
209, 252-253). 
10. The Defendant admitted that his own mother in India 
lived in a situation where she had servants to do her housework so 
she did not work outside of the home, (Tr. at R. 228-229), yet the 
Defendant insisted that Mrs. Ahluwalia work every chance she got 
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outside of the home (Tr. at R. 147), and when the Plaintiff was not 
working to the level of the Defendant's satisfaction, the Defendant 
refused to permit the Plaintiff to see her minor son and instead 
sent him to a day care (Tr. at R. 208-209). 
11. The Defendant had the minor son (age 9) in a daycare 
when he could have been with his mother, especially if she had 
custody and a teaching position (Tr. at R. 208-209). 
12. The Defendant did not support the children's and 
Mrs. Ahluwaliafs efforts to obtain spiritual and religious growth 
or opportunity. (Tr. at R. 201). 
The Court below failed to consider any of the relevant 
factors except the inferred preference of one child, the fact that 
the subject children are good kids who adjusted and so did Mr. 
Ahluwalia to a difficult situation, to the extent the relative 
abilities of the parents to provide care and perhaps the desire for 
custody. 
To the contrary, the Court ignored the critical factors 
such as: 
1. Mrs. Ahluwalia's history as the primary care taker of 
the children. 
2. Mrs. Ahluwalia's interest in maintaining that roll. 
3. The fact that Mrs. Ahluwalia's caretaker relationship 
with her children would be substantially harmed and diminished were 
they not in her custody due to Mr. Ahluwalia's abusive, 
manipulative and controlling nature. 
4. Mr. Ahluwalia's history of not being involved in the 
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children's extra-curricular activities. 
5. The unstable character and lack of emotional stability 
of Mr. Ahluwalia. 
6. The fact that Mr. Ahluwalia believed in one standard 
of living for his own mother, and another for his wife who has 
supported his career and children, thus indicating a potential 
serious problem as to how he will treat his children in the future. 
7. The fact that Mrs. Ahluwalia was willing to move out 
of her home to remove the stress of her relationship with Mr. 
Ahluwalia, and to follow the wishes of the children in leaving them 
in the home, not out of self-interest, but out of an interest in 
the well-being of the children, indicates her love and concern for 
the children's well-being. 
8. To the contrary, Mr. Ahluwalia brought his father 
into the home and permitted him to live without discussing the 
matter with Mrs. Ahluwalia and without her consent. (Tr. at R. 205-
207), indicating a total lack of concern for the family's situation 
and feelings. 
Trial Courts must consider seriously such issues. In the 
case of Meyers v. Meyers 7 68 P. 2d 979 (Utah App. 1989) the Court at 
page 93 indicated that frequently custody determination involve 
"good versus better" and therefore a Trial Court should consider 
various relevant factors in determining which custodial arrangement 
is in the child's best interests. No one set of factors governs 
every case and the Trial Court has an obligation to articulate 
findings of those factors which may be pertinent to a child's best 
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interest which the Court considered in making its determination of 
the custody issue. 
As set forth in the case of Roendahl v. Roendahl, 240 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 19 94) at page 26, the Court there 
quoted Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-10 (Supp. 1993)(2) and 
stated: 
(2) The Court shall consider, among other factors the 
Court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act 
in the best interests of the child, including allowing 
the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
The Court is required to consider this element regarding 
custody. The language of the statute says shall consider. The 
Trial Court failed to give this issue any weight at all even though 
the evidence indicated Mrs. Ahluwalia should have custody because 
of this issue. Multiple other factors may be considered as set 
forth in Roendahl, supra. 
As set forth in the case of Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 
(Utah App. 1990) at page 411 the Court indicated: 
"the best interest of a minor child are promoted by 
having respect and love both parents. Fostering a 
child's relationship with the non-custodial parent has an 
important bearing on the child's best interest." 
The overwhelming weight and preponderance of the 
important evidence as set forth above, clearly shows that while 
both parties are fit and proper parents, Mrs. Ahluwalia as the 
primary caretaker and nurturer of the minor children and the one 
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who was willing to make difficult and sacrificial decisions to 
remove stress from the lives of her children and family clearly 
exhibit that Mrs. Ahluwalia has the greatest amount of love, 
concern and ability to care for the well being of the children. To 
take these children away from such a mother is a clear abuse of 
discretion and has resulted in such a serious inequity as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion, and clearly cuts against the 
weight of the evidence. 
The decision to leave the children together and in the 
family home could have been as easily made by placing the Plaintiff 
back in the family home, and the Defendant being required to move 
out. Ms. Hickey testified that after the family stress was 
minimized by virtue of the separation of the parties, the children 
began to flourish. Yet Ms. Hickey further testified that the 
reduction in stress was really as a result of Mrs. Ahluwalia being 
gone and if the reverse had occurred with Mr. Ahluwalia leaving, 
the effect on the children and in the home would have been the 
same. (Tr. at R. 183-184). In other words, the reason the children 
had flourished is because stress was removed from the family and 
the children would have flourished whether the mother or father 
remained as the custodial parent. 
The Court stated (Tr. at R. 277) that it was to deal with 
the custody situation at the time of the divorce trial rather than 
at the time of separation. At the time of separation, the 
Plaintiff had made a difficult decision which at this point in time 
appears to have been the best one for the family. However, it 
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turned out to be the most negative one for Mrs. Ahluwalia's 
personal rights as decided by the Trial Court regarding custody of 
her children. Whether the Trial Court believed it or not, in 
essence, Mrs. Ahluwalia has been severely penalized by moving out 
of the home to the benefit of the children, rather than seeking to 
have Mr. Ahluwalia removed from the home and potentially continuing 
the stress. This is an inequitable result that should not go 
against Mrs. Ahluwalia. What she did benefitted the children. She 
must receive credit for such sacrifice. 
It is uncontroverted that Mrs. Ahluwalia substantially 
raised and nurtured these children without participation from the 
Defendant, who when he would come home from work would simply sit 
down and watch television (Tr. at R. 204). While it is admirable 
that the Defendant, since he has had custody of the children, has 
worked to establish a better and more participatory relationship 
with the minor children. It is still a serious injustice rising to 
the level of an abuse of discretion to take the minor children from 
the parent who has spent so much time with them, nurturing them and 
caring for them, during their entire lives and to place it with a 
person who did not do that until he was forced pursuant to a 
separation. For these reasons, the Trial Court should be reversed 
on its custody decision and Mrs. Ahluwalia should be awarded 
custody of the minor children, she should be placed in the family 
residence with them and the Defendant should be required to pay the 
appropriate amount of child support. 
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B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING MRS. AHLUWALIA'S 
REQUEST FOR ALIMONY? 
The Trial Court clearly and blatantly abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant Mrs. Ahluwalia's request for 
alimony. In marshalling the evidence in support of the Court's 
verdict, as required of an appellant, such evidence is as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff has a teaching degree and has taught 
school. (Tr. at R. 141-143). 
2. The Plaintiff was employed as a full time substitute 
in the Granite School District, which means that she substitutes on 
a regular basis on every day that school is in session. However, 
she only gets paid for the hours she works, she does not get paid 
for vacations, teacher's work days and does not receive benefits 
and her hours are limited on a weekly basis. (Tr. at R. 151-154, 
225-226, 266-267), Trial Exhibit 4. 
3. The Plaintiff worked in the optical/contact lens 
field for a period of time while the parties lived in Pennsylvania 
(Tr. at R. 147-148). 
4. The Plaintiff had a job interview in the contact lens 
field but did not follow through with it because she wanted to see 
what would happen with the custody of her children and did not want 
to be precluded from having custody by virtue of any conflict that 
employment might cause. (Tr. at R. 217-218). 
5. The Court imputed income to Mrs. Ahluwalia in the sum 
of $1,021 based upon the erroneous calculation of $6.25 per hour 
for 38 hours per week. (Tr. at R. 275), notwithstanding a complete 
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lack of testimony or other evidence to support that Mrs. Ahluwalia 
can earn such amount on a full-time, year round, regular basis. 
6. The Court made the finding that the Plaintiff was not 
specifically looking hard enough for employment to satisfy the 
Court and therefore declined her any alimony whatsoever. (Tr. at R. 
264-265). 
To the contrary, the Court clearly overlooked the weighty 
evidence which supported that Mrs. Ahluwalia was entitled to 
permanent alimony. That evidence is as follows: 
1. This is a 17-year marriage (Tr. at R. 140). 
2. Mrs. Ahluwalia was employed in a tenured teaching 
position in Florida at the time of the marriage between the parties 
and continued that employment for the first two years of the 
marriage. (Tr. at R. 177-178). 
3. Mrs. Ahluwalia left her tenured teaching employment 
to support the Defendant in his career when the family left Florida 
and moved to Pennsylvania (Tr. at R. 178-179). 
4. Mrs. Ahluwalia was not able to look for a teaching 
position because of the insistence of the Defendant that she go to 
work immediately upon their arrival in Pennsylvania (Tr. at R. 147-
148). 
5. Mrs. Ahluwalia's employment in the optical/contact 
lens field and in the day care field when she worked in 
Pennsylvania paid her substantially less than she would have earned 
in the teaching profession (Tr. at R. 148-149). 
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6. When the parties left Pennsylvania and moved to Utah, 
Mrs. Ahluwalia sought to be requalified to teach (Tr. at R. 150-
151) . 
7. Mrs. Ahluwalia has been seeking employment in the 
teaching field for several years but has been unable to obtain or 
secure any kind of tenured or salaried position (Tr. at R. 151-
152). 
8. Mrs. Ahluwalia desires to remain employed in be 
employed in the teaching field because it provides her with an 
opportunity to spend more time with her children, it was where she 
was trained and it paid better than the temporary types of 
employment she had outside of the teaching field since leaving 
Florida (Tr. at R. 157). 
9. Mrs. Ahluwalia has been used to living in homes with 
enough rooms and bedrooms to provide for her family. (Tr. at R. 
158-162). Trial Exhibit 2. 
10. Mrs. Ahluwalia 's financial information indicates 
that she had expenses of approximately $1500 per month. Trial 
Exhibit 2. 
11. Mr. Ahluwalia's financial declaration indicates that 
he has a disposable income above and beyond his expenses, of at 
least $1900 per month from which alimony could be paid. (Tr. at R. 
228-249, 262-263). Trial Exhibits 15 and 17. 
12. Mrs. Ahluwalia would lose money each month at either 
her actual current or imputed income earning level while she worked 
as a full time substitute or in the optical/contact lens field and 
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could not meet her monthly expenses. (Tr. at R. 139). Trial Exhibit 
4. 
13. Mr. Ahluwalia made a $19,000 expenditure for a car, 
roughly a four times more expensive vehicle than he had ever 
purchased in the past, after this divorce action was filed and had 
the resources to support such a purchase. (Tr. at R. 241). 
14. On the other hand, Mrs. Ahluwalia has an old car 
that breaks down continually. (Tr. at R. 162-163). 
15. The Defendant has the money to take children on 
trips and pay for entertainment expenses of $400 per month. (Tr. 
at R. 245). 
16. The Defendant's employment is stable. (Tr. at R. 
226-27). 
17. Mrs. Ahluwalia's employment has no stability 
whatsoever. (Tr. at R. 154-157). 
18. The Court found Mrs. Ahluwalia to be capable of full 
time work, but did not find the income level at which she could be 
employed, except for imputing $6.25 per hour, which she has not 
earned on a full time basis. (Tr. at R. 128-29). 
19. Mr. Ahluwalia stated and agreed Mrs. Ahluwalia 
should work where she is qualified (Tr. at R. 254-55). 
As set forth in the Roendahl, supra case at pages 2 6 and 
27: 
"the general purpose of alimony is to prevent the 
receiving spouse from becoming a public charge and to 
maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage, to the extent possible.... In determining 
whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, the 
trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions 
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and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) 
the ability of the payor spouse to provide support .... 
Where "the payor spouse's resources are adequate, alimony 
needs not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but 
should also consider the recipient spouse's 'station in 
life"1 
The trial court must make findings concerning the 
elements raised above. In the extant matter, the trial court 
barely noted the Defendant's and Plaintiff's financial conditions. 
The Court then made its own conclusions rather than relying upon 
the uncontroverted testimony at trial and the court's conclusions 
are not supported by any evidence. 
In the Utah case of Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah 
App. 1991) this court has indicated that alimony should be based 
upon the standard of living at the time of the divorce trial. This 
Court indicated that in determining the standard of living in order 
to set alimony after a divorce is a fact sensitive subjective task 
and not determined by the expenses alone. This Court further ruled 
that, at page 1212: 
"Second, the court should set alimony as permitted by 
those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of 
living as closely as possible...." The Utah Supreme 
Court reviewed an alimony award after a long term 
marriage. The court found that the alimony award in that 
situation should "to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standard of living and maintain them 
at a level as close as possible to that standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage." 
The Court also found that when the payor spouse's 
resources are adequate, alimony should not just be limited to 
provide for basic needs but also should consider the recipient's 
spouse's "station in life". Howell, supra at 1212. 
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This reasoning is supported by multiple Utah cases 
including Bingham v. Bingham, 23 6 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah App. 
1994); Schaumberg v. Schaumberq, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah App. 
1994); Hill v. Hill, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah App. 1993); 
Rappleye v. Rappleye, Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App. 1993); Hoagland 
v. Hoaaland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 1993); and Burt v. 
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990). 
Additionally, the Court totally ignored the equity of 
Mrs. Ahluwalia's expectation that she be given a chance to return 
to a position in the teaching profession after she supported the 
Defendant in his growth in his professional capacity. The Court's 
finding regarding Mr. Ahluwalia's finances are totally unsupported 
by the evidence and therefore an abuse of discretion in its 
interpretation of the financial evidence before it. 
The monthly living expenses and income as stated by the 
parties were uncontroverted by the Defendant's own evidence. 
Therefore, those are the sums that should be relied upon for the 
determination of alimony and Mrs. Ahluwalia should not be punished 
by the Court for not obtaining employment in a field at a lesser 
rate than she could obtain in the professional field in which she 
is trained. 
The Trial Court grossly abused its discretion and ignored 
the facts in failing to award the Plaintiff any alimony. The 
Defendant has disposable income every month. The Court had already 
made up its mind on the alimony issue before even reviewing the 
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financial exhibits of the parties, (Tr. at R. 269). In fact, the 
statement of the Trial Court that the case had "droned on", when in 
fact it had only been going about three to hour hours, on the 
issues of a mother's custody of her children, indicates the Trial 
Court had lost interest in the case or came to its conclusions 
irregardless of the evidence. 
The Court refused to award alimony on the basis that it 
found Mrs. Ahluwalia was not looking hard enough for employment. 
However, the Court had already at that time imputed income to the 
Plaintiff so whether the Plaintiff had imputed income or was 
actually earning the imaginary $1021 per month, under any 
circumstance she was being charged with that liability. 
Notwithstanding that liability, she was still going in the hole in 
terms of monthly expenditures at least $500-$600 per month while 
the Defendant had $1900 per month of disposable income with which 
to pay alimony. 
The real obscenity and abuse of discretion in the Court's 
failure to award Mrs. Ahluwalia alimony is the uncontroverted 
testimony that Mrs. Ahluwalia had a tenured teaching position in 
the state of Florida which she gave up so that the family could 
move to Pennsylvania and then Utah, in support of the Defendant's 
career. 
Since that time, Mrs. Ahluwalia worked in part time or 
lower paying jobs at the insistence of the Defendant, and was not 
able to secure any type of beneficial long time position for 
herself. This factual situation suited the Defendant fine, because 
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he had the money from Mrs. Ahluwalia's employment at his disposal 
as well as his own and yet he did not participate in the raising of 
the children in any meaningful manner. 
When these parties are now divorced after 17 years of 
marriage, the Defendant is in a high paid professional position 
that he has held for many years with likely prospects of continued 
employment for the foreseeable future. To the contrary, Mrs. 
Ahluwalia is unable to find a job in her profession which would pay 
double which she is currently earning, and the Trial Court, a court 
of equity, did not even give enough consideration for her efforts 
to this family to award her alimony for a period of time to 
rehabilitate or retrain herself to find a professional position 
consistent with her training so that she could at least return to 
the position she was in which she gave up for the benefit of the 
Defendant's career. This is a serious injustice resulting in an 
abuse of discretion that should be reversed, and an appropriate 
award of alimony should be ordered. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Ahluwalia was the primary caretaker of the children 
and through her efforts for the family deserves to be awarded full 
custody of the minor children of the parties. Her sacrifices, love 
and concern for the children have always been utmost and the 
evidence unquestionably supports that set of facts. On the other 
hand, the Defendant only paid attention to the children when he was 
26 
forced to by virtue of the separation of the parties and was 
willing to impose difficult situations on the family without 
consideration for Mrs. Ahluwalia or the children's feelings. 
As a result of Mrs. Ahluwalia's love, concern and efforts 
for the minor children, it is an abuse of discretion and a serious 
injustice to not award her custody of the minor children, 
possession of the residence of the parties, subject to a lien by 
the Defendant and an appropriate award of child support under the 
schedule in effect for the State of Utah. 
The Trial Court seriously abused its discretion in not 
awarding any alimony whatsoever to Mrs. Ahluwalia. After a 17-year 
marriage, when she gave up a tenured teaching position in Florida 
to support the career of the Defendant and after the uncontroverted 
evidence at Trial indicates that Mr. Ahluwalia has at least $1900 
every month in disposable income, to not require Mr. Ahluwalia to 
pay alimony is a serious injustice. The fact that Mrs. Ahluwalia 
goes in the hole every month regarding her income/expenses and that 
she has been reduced to living in a one-bedroom apartment losing 
money every month as a result of this court's callous disregard for 
her "station in life" is also a serious injustice resulting in an 
abuse of discretion. The Trial Court should not be permitted to so 
ignore the evidence. 
As a Court of equity, this Court must recognize the 
substantial contribution to this family and to the career of the 
Defendant made by the Plaintiff and permit her at the very least an 
opportunity, by virtue of an award of permanent alimony, to be 
27 
retrained in a profession where she can earn a living similar to 
that which she would have been earning in a teaching position or to 
be given the time and opportunity to find a teaching position in a 
location close to where her children are located in order to 
continue her career in her trained profession. To do otherwise to 
Mrs. Ahluwalia is a clear and obvious abuse of her rights as a 
contributing human being to this family and this Court should be 
embarrassed that she was treated so callously. 
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